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I am very grateful for the opportunity to address this audience at
International Law Weekend 2013. I have practiced in New York now for
more than twenty-five years, and I've watched this weekend grow into what
Ruth Wedgwood has just fairly described as a landmark on the international
law calendar. So thanks to Ruth,' and to David Stewart,2 and to John
Noyes,3 and to all their ABILA4 colleagues for inviting me, and to Fordham
Law School and the Leitner Center for so generously hosting this whole
event.
It's a special treat for the President of the American Society of
International Law to be making this address this year, because as Ruth has
mentioned, ASIL' will be collaborating this coming spring with the
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American Branch of the International Law Association to host a joint
meeting, which promises to gather some 2000 international lawyers from
around the world. ASEL and the ILA6 are structurally different, but they are
very much likeminded organizations. Each of us is in the business of
developing, debating, and disseminating international law with the
objective of strengthening the rule of law on the international plane. I
should add, too, that even though we are the American Society, close to half
our membership are non-U.S. nationals, and we very much aim at our
annual meetings to provide an international forum. So we look forward to
collaborating with the LA and its American Branch this spring, and you all
should plan to be there.
But I turn back to this meeting, and its focus on the
internationalization of law and legal practice. Just glancing at the program,
it's clear that you have before you an intellectual treat, in the form of an
extraordinary range of projects and a truly impressive roster of speakers.
But I start this talk with a glance at the program for an additional reason, as
it confirms the conference theme by so pointedly illustrating the ferocious
expansion of subject matter governed or touched by international law. You
have programs on family law, Internet law, human trafficking not as a
matter of domestic crime but as a human rights issue, and a whole range of
other topics. The program also demonstrates how deeply international law
has penetrated domestic legal systems, to a degree that would surely
surprise the visionaries from a century or more ago who founded ASE and
the LA. Finally, the program makes a parallel point by showing the
expansion of conduct, by both state and private actors, that is subject to
independent examination in the form of international adjudication and
arbitration. You have panels on international discovery and U.S. litigation,
standards of review in investor-state arbitration, the referral mechanism of
the international criminal tribunals, the Inter-American human rights
system, head-of-state prosecutions at the ICC,7 and organizing arbitral
proceedings. That's quite a range.
As I reflected on how I might address the conference theme today, I
realized that, if you'll allow me to say so, that theme-the
internationalization of law and legal practice--closely reflected my own
career. Let me explain.
I went to law school thinking I was going to be a litigator, hopefully
starting as a prosecutor at the U.S. Attorney's Office downtown. But I also
had a real interest in international matters. So I faced a seeming dilemma-
since litigation is jurisdiction-specific, how can I be a litigator and still do
6. International Law Association.
7. International Criminal Court.
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international work? Then, after having the great privilege of working for
Justice Blackmun, who himself had great respect for the international
system, I went to work for Judge Howard M. Holtzmann at the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal in The Hague. There I was introduced to the
universe of international dispute resolution, though, as I will explain, it was
not nearly as expansive a universe as it is today. So I came back to New
York looking for a firm that had a discrete international dimension to its
litigation practice, and a strong commitment to pro bono work as well.
My plan was to develop an international disputes practice that
encompassed commercial work, public international law work, and human
rights work. Actually, though I'm calling it a plan and making it sound
quite specific, it would probably be more accurate to describe it as an
instinct, a strong one, but not very specific. In my defense, I should note
that this was twenty-five years ago, and there were few models for this kind
of practice around. But whether by plan or by instinct, my practice has
developed in a way that mirrors the theme you all have been discussing this
weekend. So at the behest of Ruth and David, and with your indulgence, I
will address the conference theme by combining in my remarks both
professional observations and personal reflections.
That necessarily means that I will be looking at the theme through the
lens of international adjudication and arbitration. Of course, I don't mean
to suggest that the internationalization of law and legal practice is only
evident in that field, or that that's the only lens through which one might
examine the phenomenon. As I emphasized at the outset, far from it. But
it's the means by which I will find it easiest to describe the contemporary
practice of international law.
I want to do this in five steps. First, I'll consider in turn 1) interstate
adjudication; 2) the emerging transnational justice system of international
arbitration; 3) the governance regime reflected in investor-state arbitration;
and 4) the adjudication of international cases in national courts. I'll then
consider 5) an especially compelling example of the intersection of the
international and national planes. I recognize that this will not be a
comprehensive tour even of the universe of international adjudication and
arbitration. For example, I am not going to talk about the international
trade regime and I will refer if at all only fleetingly to the international
human rights system. But I think the areas I will address will suffice to
make the point. Then I will conclude-be careful-with a few points of
advice and encouragement.
I begin with the traditional model of international adjudication, that of
interstate adjudicatory bodies. These bodies have one feature in common:
They derive their jurisdiction from the consent of states. They are generally
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created by treaty, and as a consequence they exist and operate within the
confines agreed to by states.
Though we have had examples in earlier times of arbitral
commissions, such as those established by the Treaty of Paris, and of ad
hoc tribunals, such as that established in the much-heralded Alabama
arbitration, the first permanent body of this kind was the Permanent Court
of Arbitration established by the First Hague Peace Conference in 1899.
The international lawyers of the time who drove that vision were navigating
uncharted territory. Never before had a permanent international court
existed, and many thought that the enterprise was quixotic and bound to
fail.
Those critics were wrong, as we know. Not only did the Permanent
Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice follow,
but the soon-to-be-published Oxford Handbook on International Courts will
count at least twenty-five permanent international courts and tribunals in
existence. And these courts and tribunals have not only increased
dramatically in number, but considered cumulatively, they have also
acquired jurisdiction over an increasingly broad scope of subject matter and
ever more diverse actors, including individuals.
Some years ago it seemed the intellectual vogue to talk about the
fragmentation of international law, and many people thought of that as an
unhelpful development brought about by the proliferation of international
courts. But if you think of it from a different perspective, that is, as I said a
moment ago, as an increase in the quantum of conduct that is subject to
independent and impartial adjudication, it may appear differently. We
might, indeed, begin to think of this set of international courts as an
international judicial system.
I want to make two quick points in that vein. First, I want to focus on
the term "judicial," in order to ask whether we are looking at judicial
institutions. I'm going to use the example of provisional measures before
the ICJ.8 It was long the majority view that provisional measures indicated
by the ICJ under Article 41 of the ICJ Statute were not binding. In the Case
on the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, though, after the United
States failed to abide by an order of provisional measures requiring that it
take all steps necessary to halt the execution of a Paraguayan national by
the Commonwealth of Virginia, we made the argument on behalf of
Paraguay that the order was indeed binding and that, as a consequence, the
United States had breached an international obligation by failing to comply.
That case dId not go forward, but that same set of facts repeated themselves
in the LaGrand Case, and there the Court held that provisional measures
8. International Court of Justice.
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were binding. The question we had tried to put to the Court was
straightforward-was the Court a court? The Court's reasoning was
equally straightforward, and I think it fair to say that it reduced to the
proposition that if the Court were to fulfill its function as a "judicial" organ,
it must have the authority to issue binding orders intended to preserve its
capacity to decide the dispute. That ruling, in turn, had considerable
influence over other international tribunals deciding, or reconsidering, the
binding character of their own provisional measures orders.
Second, I want to focus on the term "system," in order to ask whether
we are dealing with an integrated justice system. The influence on one
another of the various international courts and tribunals that considered the
binding character of provisional measures would suggest that there was
some form of system at work. We might confirm that sense by considering
the further development by those international courts and tribunals that
have recognized the binding character of provisional measures of the
criteria for their issuance. Once these courts and tribunals decided that
provisional measures were binding, they needed to decide the
considerations by which an application would be evaluated. There has
ensued a rich dialogue, in particular between the ICJ and investor-state
tribunals constituted under the ICSID9 Convention and Rules and other
regimes. Must the court or tribunal consider the applicant's prospects of
success, and at what threshold? What constitutes irreparable harm? Does
the objective to avoid exacerbating the dispute constitute an independent
ground on which provisional measures might be granted? The ICJ
continues to work through these issues, and, frequently referring to but not
always following ICJ jurisprudence, so do investor-state tribunals.
Indeed, as they consider awards rendered under other treaties on
similar issues, investor-state tribunals constituted on an ad hoc basis to hear
a single specific dispute now consider the very question of their relationship
with other tribunals in this radically horizontal structure. Given that
structure, is each tribunal a completely independent decision-maker, or
should it take into account other decisions in order to provide predictability
by developing a jurisprudence constant on recurring questions? In effect,
these tribunals are debating to what extent the investor-state arbitration
system is, in the end, an integrated system.
The second component of this international legal order that I want to
mention is what I would consider the emerging transnational justice system
represented by international commercial arbitration. What do I mean by
transnational? There are three distinguishing features. First, the system
involves the delegation of dispute resolution authority to decision-makers
9. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.
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who are not directly appointed, regulated, or supervised by any individual
state or group of states. To me, this is truly striking, as one of the core
functions of the modem state is to provide for the impartial adjudication of
civil disputes, and then to bring its coercive authority to bear in order to
give effect to the resolution of the dispute. In international arbitration, that
authority is delegated to a decision-maker operating outside the direct
authority of any State.
The second feature of this transnational justice system is the
application of a diverse body of national and international law to both
substance and procedure. As to substance, it means that there is no such
thing as foreign law in international arbitration. As to procedure, there has
developed both a common set of expectations about the conduct of
international arbitrations and the recognition of the tribunal's discretion to
diverge from that common set of expectations to meet the particular needs
of a given case.
The third feature I highlight is the willingness of national judicial
authorities to enforce the decisions of entities that operate not only outside
of their own jurisdiction, but outside the jurisdiction of any state. Due to
the almost universal ratification of the New York Convention, most
national courts are required to enforce foreign awards subject only to very
limited review--essentially to ensure the basic integrity of the process that
led to the award.
What does that mean for the practitioner? It means that we can
develop a litigation practice that literally spans the globe. For example, I
have tried cases in Moscow, Hong Kong, Rio, Sdo Paulo, Zurich, Paris,
London, San Francisco, Washington, and New York. It means also that you
have the chance to work with and against truly talented lawyers from
literally around the globe. Just a few weeks ago, before the parties settled
the case on the Friday before a Monday start, we were about to try a case in
Sdo Paulo in which we had French, Brazilian, and New York lawyers on
both sides, and a tribunal consisting of arbitrators from Belgium, Germany,
and Switzerland. And these cases go forward, as I said before, under a
wide variety of governing laws and pursuant to a wide variety of
procedures.
The third area I'd like to address is investor-state arbitration. It has
frequently been remarked that one of the great developments of
international law in the second half of the twentieth century has been the
expansion of its subjects, and perhaps the two most important components
of that development are, first, greater protection of fundamental human
rights and the development of the notion that international law regulates to
an important extent the relationship between nationals and their own state,
and, second, the recognition that individuals and business entities may
contract with and resolve disputes against states on the international plane.
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That latter phenomenon is manifested in the arbitration provisions of many
bilateral investment treaties.
You will know of the basic investor-state regime. Over the last several
decades, but at an accelerating pace more recently, there has been a
proliferation of bilateral and multilateral investment treaties with two
important features. First of all, these treaties provide substantive
protections to nationals of one state investing in the other. But for my
purposes, even more importantly, they provide in most cases for the right of
an investor to bring arbitration proceedings to remedy breaches of the
substantive standards. In effect, one state makes an open-ended offer to
nationals of the other state as defined in the treaty to bring claims in their
own name against the host state for alleged violations of the treaty
protections. That, you will appreciate, is an extremely important move
away from the traditional model of diplomatic protection. And it is
reinforced by the obligation of other states, under either the New York
Convention or the ICSID Convention, to give effect to foreign arbitral
awards by reducing them to a national judgment.
To use a simple example from my own practice, some years ago we
represented a cement manufacturer whose plant in a Latin American state
had been expropriated. Had there been no applicable bilateral investment
treaty, the investor would have had to face the frequently insuperable
obstacles of suing the expropriating state in a national court. Instead, it
brought proceedings under the BIT'0 and reached a settlement that would
almost certainly not have been possible absent the threat of the arbitration
proceedings. In a different case in which I sat as arbitrator, the tribunal
heard claims that actions by national prosecutors had breached the
obligation of fair and equitable treatment accorded the investor by the
bilateral investment treaty.
I turn finally to national courts. During the span of my own career,
there has been a dramatic increase in both the number and type of
international disputes submitted to national courts for resolution. National
courts now routinely interpret and apply treaties, including human rights
treaties and treaties governing more mundane matters, such as the Warsaw
Convention. Similarly, national courts regularly interpret and apply foreign
law, including in the interpretation of contracts, and more generally, resolve
commercial disputes between entities and individuals from different
jurisdictions.
National courts are also increasingly asked to adjudicate state conduct,
particularly in light of the widespread acceptance of the restrictive view of
sovereign immunity. Again, I'll give you a few examples from my own
10. Bilateral Investment Treaty.
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practice. I have done cases in which I have enforced the treaty rights of
international organizations within the U.S. legal system. I have litigated
sovereign immunity issues in the United States courts both in human rights
cases and in commercial cases, and I have also litigated the question of
what state should take cognizance of the dispute.
For example, I recently argued before the Third Circuit in a case
involving the alleged violation by a foreign insurance commissioner of an
anti-suit injunction issued by a U.S. federal court. The case arose when the
commissioner sought to enforce in the Cayman Islands a judgment rendered
in his own state. So, in effect, there was a three-way contest, and each of
those courts had to decide the extent to which where they were prepared to
assert their jurisdiction.
For another example, some years ago, we brought an action in federal
court against Ethiopia on behalf of a class of Eritreans whom Ethiopia had
deported during the Eritrean-Ethiopian War. We first went to the D.C.
Circuit on the question of whether diplomatic protection by Eritrea in the
form of claims brought before the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission in
the exercise of diplomatic protection constituted an adequate forum for
purposes of the forum non conveniens doctrine. We won on that score. We
then went back to the D.C. Circuit on the question of whether the necessary
contacts existed to confer subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA." On
a fairly technical question, we did not prevail. But, again, the case serves as
an example both of litigation against foreign states in national court and of
courts trying to decide where such a case may be decided.
For another example, reverting to the transnational justice system I just
mentioned, U.S. courts, like other national courts are regularly asked to
determine whether to give effect to foreign arbitral awards. In a recent case
I argued in the Second Circuit, a Brazilian party was seeking to enforce an
arbitral award rendered in Sio Paulo. The losing party argued that it had
never agreed to arbitrate the dispute. We persuaded the Second Circuit that
the district court had erred by failing to give effect to the arbitral tribunal's
determination that the dispute was within the scope of the arbitration clause
and hence that the tribunal had jurisdiction. The Court sent it back to the
district court to determine whether the parties had formed an arbitration
agreement in the first place, and proceedings are now pending there.
In a final example, we represented a foreign government in a case in
federal court in D.C. in which an adverse party sought to enforce an award.
We argued that the arbitral tribunal's authority had been properly revoked
under the law applicable to the proceedings, that of the juridical seat. The
district court agreed, effectively, that if the arbitrators' authority had been
]1. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
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validly revoked the arbitration could not have gone forward and the award
could not be enforced. So here's another instance of a national court having
to decide whether to give effect to a foreign arbitral award.
So, before getting to the advice part, I want to talk about a set of recent
cases in which there was an especially dramatic intersection of the
international and national planes, which allows us to look closely at the
evolving international legal order. In the Avena case between Mexico and
the United States, the International Court of Justice held that the United
States had violated its obligations under the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations in the case of fifty-two Mexican nationals on death row
in various states of the United States.12 To reach that decision, the ICJ had
to decide to what extent obligations under the treaty reached into the
criminal justice system of States party to the Convention, in the face of
arguments by the United States that the Court should not insert itself into
the dispute because, if it did, it would effectively be acting as a court of
criminal appeal.13 The Court held that there had been violations in fifty-one
of those cases, and provided as a remedy that the United States provide
review and consideration of those convictions and sentences within its own
legal system.14
By Article 94(1) of the United Nations Charter, the United States had
undertaken to comply with the judgment of the ICJ in any case to which it
was a party. President Bush, citing the paramount importance of complying
with that obligation for purposes of maintaining the credibility of the
United States in international affairs and the safety of U.S. nationals living,
working, and traveling abroad, issued a memorandum in which he ordered
state courts to take jurisdiction of claims for review and reconsideration by
any of the fifty-one nationals.
In the Medellin case, one of the Mexican nationals subject to the
Avena judgment sought to enforce that judgment, and as a consequence the
U.S. Supreme Court considered the constitutional issues arising from his
request.' 5 In that case, Medellin argued that pursuant to the Supremacy
Clause, which made treaties, like statutes, the supreme law of the land, U.S.
courts had to enforce the judgment by virtue of Article 94(1) without any
further action by the President or Congress.' 6 The President argued that the
U.S. courts did not have the constitutional authority to decide whether to
12. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004
I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2010).
16. Id. at 504.
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enforce the judgment, but rather that that authority was entrusted to him by
virtue of his Article II foreign affairs power, and he asked the Court to give
effect to his determination that the United States would comply." Texas
argued that neither the Supremacy Clause nor the President's determination
was sufficient, but that Congress had to legislate compliance.' 8 Nobody
questioned that the United States had an obligation to comply under
international law; the only issue was whether and how that obligation was
enforceable as a matter of U.S. law.
In the Medellin decision, the Supreme Court held that the Article 94(1)
obligation did not have the status of domestic law and that hence neither the
Court acting directly under the Supremacy Clause nor the President acting
pursuant to Article II could give that obligation effect.'9 In its view,
because the Article 94(1) obligation was not "self-executing," only
Congress could act to comply. 2 0 Specifically, rather than assuming that the
President and the Senate, the constitutionally authorized treaty-makers,
would have intended the United States to comply absent contrary
congressional direction under the later-in-time rule, the Court reasoned that
Article 94(1) should be interpreted to preserve what it described as the
"option of noncompliance." 2 1
As Ruth mentioned in her introduction, I argued for Mexico in the ICJ
in Avena and for the petitioner in Medellin, so it will come as no surprise
that I disagree with the conclusion. But I am not, I am quick to assure you,
going to subject you this afternoon to my critique of that decision. I want
instead to make a simple point about our subject today.
In Avena, by fashioning the remedy that it did, I think it fair to
understand that the ICJ effectively invited the Supreme Court to partner
with it in the enforcement of international law. This time, the Supreme
Court declined that invitation. I maintain the hope that on some future
occasion, in some other case, a different result will ensue. But just the fact
that the situation arose in which the highest judicial organ of the United
Nations and the U.S. Supreme Court both had to consider these
fundamental questions and had to consider, in effect, the boundary between
each other's authority illustrates in the brightest colors possible the
internationalization of law and legal practice that is this conference's
theme.
17. Id. at 523-24.
18. Id. at 504.
19. Id. at 498-99.
20. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 525-26.
21. Id. at 511.
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So, what does this all mean for all of you? Here, I direct my
comments to the students and young lawyers at the conference. I have tried
today to speak of four discrete spheres of international adjudication-the
interstate, the transnational, the investor-state, and the national-and to try
at the same time to suggest the coalescence to some degree of these spheres
into a greater international legal order. This system is dynamic, and it has
boundaries that are hard to define. Surely, for example, the traditional
dichotomy between public international and private international law
provides little help in understanding the international legal order as it exists
today. For these reasons, this system will be subject to your influence as
the international lawyers of today and tomorrow.
As you consider what role you might play in that international legal
order, I want to give you three pieces of advice and three points of
encouragement. First, if you want to be an international lawyer, a
practicing international lawyer, there are some basic skill sets that you will
need to have. I've suggested that this is a very wide legal order that touches
on a lot of different areas. So it will be very important to be well versed not
just in general public international law, not just in basic tools of treaty
interpretation and the like, but also in fields such as comparative law, in
commercial law, and in human rights law. In but one example, one of the
debates happening at the moment in the investor-state community is the
extent to which human rights law should have an impact on investment
treaty interpretation and hence investor-state arbitration. To be an effective
international lawyer, you need to have broad training in international law
but also a grounding in national law and their intersection.
Secondly, no matter what form of practice you might take, whether
you're going to be an advocate, a private advisor, an international
transactional lawyer, a regulator, or a policy-maker, whether you're going
to work at a law firm, a private company, an NGO, 22 an international
organization, a foreign ministry, or another government body, you should
have a sound grounding in international economics and corporate finance.
This suggestion sometimes comes as a great shock to young lawyers
thinking that they're going to practice international law. But governments
are economic actors as well as regulators, and private companies generate
enormous impact precisely because of their economic activity, and if one
wishes to be effective in addressing that activity, whatever the context, one
should have the relevant expertise.
And finally, if you want to be an advocate, it's extremely important
that you have a wide range of advocacy skills. That is, if you're going to be
an international practitioner, you really should be prepared to stand up in a
22. Non-Governmental Organization.
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national court one week, before an international arbitration tribunal
composed of three common lawyers or civil lawyers or a mix of both the
next, and in an international court or tribunal after that. What does that
mean? That means you should be well trained in your own advocacy
culture. We all come from some place and we all have to get our first set of
skills. But we must also be prepared to adjust to new advocacy cultures so
that you can operate in a wide variety of fora.
I will give you an example from international arbitration. As
international arbitration has become more and more international, that is as
more and more nationals from the jurisdictions that it actually affects
become practitioners, and administrators, and arbitrators, we see the
phenomenon, wonderful to watch, of young lawyers from Brazil, and India,
and Japan, and other jurisdictions, many of whose advocacy cultures may
not use cross-examination, become skilled cross-examiners. Why?
Because the general set of expectations in most international arbitrations
these days is that there will be witness testimony and that it will be subject
to cross-examination. And so you have young lawyers who, in order to
succeed in this transnational system, have developed skills that they
wouldn't have necessarily developed in their original advocacy culture. So
as I say, it is well and good to be grounded in your own advocacy culture,
but you've got to be prepared to operate in a variety of systems.
I want to finish, if I may, with three points of encouragement. The
bottom line is that you are incredibly lucky to be at this point in your career.
As I said at the outset of these remarks, I started with a strong instinct about
what I wanted to make happen, but I would never have been able to predict
how things would actually play out. As Ruth will confirm, when you clerk
at the U.S. Supreme Court, you always watch the arguments with the hope
that you will have the chance to stand there some time. But when I lived in
The Hague, and passed the Peace Palace virtually every day on my way to
the Tribunal, I never wondered whether I would have the chance to argue
there, before the ICJ or any of the other international tribunals that
occasional conduct proceedings there. Yet because of the developments of
which I've spoken today, I've argued several times more in the Peace
Palace than in the U.S. Supreme Court. You are sitting here now knowing
that this international legal order, this universe, is expanding. That's for
sure. But you don't know how it's going to expand, and you don't know
yet what you'll be doing twenty-five years from now. I'm going to suggest
that there are three things that make it well worthwhile plunging ahead.
First of all, it's enormous fun. If you are an international legal
practitioner, you get to work with smart, dedicated, principled lawyers from
all over the world. As much as I am a sentimental U.S. patriot, I love the
opportunity to work all the time with people from all over the world. They
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will often have different backgrounds, different assumptions, different legal
training, different politics. It all makes for a great challenge, and a truly
rich intellectual exchange.
Second, and I say this recognizing that it may be that everybody thinks
this about their own practice, but in this area of international law and
international dispute resolution, theory and practice are very closely
intertwined, and we are constantly dealing with legal issues where the
public policy driving the issue is at the surface or right beneath it. Many of
the legal issues I've just talked about, in public international law, in
investor-state arbitration, in commercial arbitration, in national law like the
FSIA, will be driven by important policy considerations. If you are
prepared to test the theory against the practice and then have the practice
test the theory, you will understand both dimensions much more fully.
And finally, I would hope that wherever you go and whatever practice
area you take, you think of international law as an important component of
the rule of law. At the end of the day, we're all in this business because we
believe that the rule of law has the capacity to contribute to social and
economic development, to protect people from physical and economic
insecurity, and, at the risk of sounding grandiose, to promote the dignity of
the human person.
That's why we're lawyers; that's why we think of ourselves as part of
a noble profession. I hope that you remember that you are all members of
an increasingly visible, an increasingly influential, and an increasingly
global college of international lawyers, and that in that capacity you will
pursue the goal of a just world under law.
Thanks very much.
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